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[L.A. No. 24909. In Bank. Aug. 29, 1958.]

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Appellant.
[1] Gas-Franchises.-Where a gas company 10llatE's its lines in a

eounty pursuant to a franchise from the eounty, such franehise eonstitutes a eontract secured by the United States
Constitution against impairment by subsequent state legislation, and the eompany's rights thereunder eannot be taken or
damaged for public use cwithout just eompensation. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 14; U:S. Const., Amend. 14, § 1.)
[2] Streets-Franchises.-In the absence of a provision to the
eontrary, a public utility accepts franchise rights in public
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Gas Companies, § 3; Am.Jm., Gas Companies, § 6 et seq.
[2J See Cal.Jur.2d, Highways and Streets, §§ 204, 205.
McB:. Dig. References: [lJ Gas, § 2; [2-6,8-10] Streets, § 44; [7]
Municipal Corporations, § 48.
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streets subject to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its own expense when necessary to make way for
proper governmental use of the streets.
Id.-Franchises.-The laying of sewers is a governmental as .
distinct from a proprietary function under the rule that a •
public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject I
to. an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its
own expense when necessary to make way for proper governmental use.
Id.-Franchises.-Implied obligations of a gas eompany in its
county franchise to relocate its pipes may be invoked for the
benefit of a city operating outside of its territorial limits ; such
obligations rest on the paramount right of the people as a
whole to use the public streets wherever located, and the fact
that a franchise is granted by one political subdivision as an
agent of the state does not defeat the right of another such
agent acting in its governmental eapacity to invoke the publie
right for the public benefit.
Id.-Franchises.-The fact that a eity's use of county streets
for its sewers is authorized by Pub. UtiI. Code, § 10101, has
no bearing on the applicability of the rule that a public utility
aecepts franchise rights in public streets subjeet to an implied
obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its own expense
when necessary to make way for proper governmental use of
the streets.
Id.-Franchises.-WhiIe rights granted municipal corporations
by Pub. UtiI. Code, I 10101, to use the streets for their sewers
constitute franchises subjeet to the paramount right of the
state to make the streets safe for public travel, a franehise
exercised by a city in its governmental capacity under that
eection is not subordinate to a prior franchise granted a public
utility.
Municipal Oorporations-Extraterritorial Powers.-A eity's
use of streets for its sewers is one of its most important governmental powers, and may be exercised outside its territorial
limits without express authorization.
Streets-Franchises.-WhiIe the right of municipal corporations to require utilities to relocate their lines to make way
for governmental uses of the streets is usually described as
resting in the police power and it is frequently stated that
such power eannot be bargained away, there appears to be no
basic principle that would prohibit granting a utility a right
to compensation for relocating its lines as part of its franehise although such right would not otherwise pass.

[7] See Oal..Tur.2d, Municipal Corporations, § 198; Am•.Tur.,
Municipal Corporations, 11122, 194, 284.

)

·)
/

Aug. 1958]

SOUTHERN CAL. GAS CO. 'I1.CITr f1PL. A..
.
110 C.1d '13; 118 P.Id .all.·:' ... _.

:715
"c ....... .

[9] Id.-Franchis88.-As a public grant, a coUnty franchise authorizing a gas company to locate its lines in the public streets
is to be construed in favor of the public interest.
[10] Id.-Franchiscs.-Though a county franchise authorizing a
gas company to locate its lines in the public streets expressly
recites t~at the county reserves the right to change the grade
of any highway over which the franchise is granted "and the
grantee of said franchise, its successors or assigns, shall at
once change the location of all pipes and other appliances laid
hereunder to conform to such change of grade," this did not
exclude other similar obligations, and the maxim el%fW"sW
u.ius Bl%cluBio aZterius BSt cannot be invoked to make plain and
unambiguous the company's right to eompensation for the
eost of relocating lines necessitated by the construction of new
sewer lines by a city outside its territorial limits ; the franchise
provision cannot reasonably be interpreted as being more than
a partial expression of the parties' common-law rights and
obligations inserted out of an abundance of caution or by way
of example.

)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, JUdge. Reversedwith
directions.
Action by gas company against a city for cost of relocating
gas lines. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions.
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Bourke Jones, .Assistant
City Attorney, and Claude E. Hilker, Deputy City Attorney,
for Appellant.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and
Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellant.
T. J. Reynolds, L. T. ~ce, Allen L. Cleveland, C. R. Salter,
Bates Booth, Arville.A;'Armstrong, Jr., and Gertrude Greengard for Respondent.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Norman S. Sterry, Ira C. Powers,
Martin E. Whelan, Jr., F. T. Searls, P. E. Sloane, W. E. Johns
and R. A. Clarke as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The city of Los Angeles constructed the
La Cienega and San Fernando Relief Sewer as part of a sewer

construction program.

A short section of this sewer line
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passes under a narrow strip of land known as the County
Strip located outside the city limits in an unincorporated
area of the county of Los Angeles. To construct the sewer ,
it was necessary to relocate gas lines of the Southern Cali- :
fornia Gas Company. The company agreed to relocate its gas
lines in the County Strip subject to a later determination
of its obligation to do so at its own expense. It conceded its
obligation to relocate its lines at its own expense within the
city limits but denied that it had the same obligation with
respect to its lines located in the County Strip. After the
work was completed it brought this action against the city to
recover the costs incurred in relocating its County Strip
lines and recovered judgment for $12,003.92 plus interest.
The city appeals.
[1] The company located its lines in the county pursuant
to a county franchise. It is not disputed that this franchise
constitutes a contract secured by the United States Constitution against impairment by subsequent state legislation (see
County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Ca1.2d
378, 382 [196 P.2d 773]) and that the company's rights thereunder can not be taken or damaged for public use without
making just compensation. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 14; U.S.
Const., Amend. 14, § 1; Rt/SSell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195
[34 S.Ot. 517,58 L.Ed. 912, L.R.A. 1918E 882] ; United States
v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 168 F.2d 391, 394; City of Petaluma v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 44 Ca1.2d 284, 288 (282 P.2d
43] .) Accordingly it is necessary to determine what those
rights are.
[2] In the absence of a provision to the contrary it has
generally been held that a public utility accepts franchise
rights in public streets subject to an implied obligation to
relocate its facilities therein at its own expense when necessary
to make way for a proper governmental use of the streets.
(New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Com., 197 U.S. 453,
461-462 [25 8.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831] ; Chicago B. & Q. Railway v.Illinois, 200 U.S. 561,586 [26 S.Ot. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596] ;
Transit Corll. v. Long Island R. Co., 253 N.Y. 345 [171 N.E.
565, 566] ; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth,
(Ky.) 266 S.W.2d 308, 310; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Staie, (Fla.) 75 So.2d 796, 800; Western Gas Co.
of Washingt011 v. City of Bremerton, 21 Wn.2d 907 [153 P.2d
846,847] ; In re Delaware R1ver Joint Com., 342 Pa. 119 [19
A.2d 278, 280] ; Natick Gaslight Co. v. Inhabitants of Natick,
175 Mass. 246 [56 N.E. 292, 293] ; Opinion of the J,tsticcs,
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- - Me. - - {132 A.2d 440, 443]; Opinion of the Jtulices, N.H. [132 A.2d 613, 614].} [3] The laying
of sewers is a governmental as distinct from a proprietary
function under the foregoing rule. (Detroit Edison Co. v.
City of Detroit, 332 Mich. 348 [51 N.W.2d 245, 247-248];
Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Commissioners of Sewerage of
Louisville, 236 Ky. 376 [33 S.W.2d 344, 344-345] ; Nicholas Di
Metl1la & Sons v. City of New York, 114 N.Y.S.2d 347, 350;
Portlafld Gas &- Coke Co. v. Giebisclt, 84 Ore. 632 {165 P. 1004,
L.R.A. 1917E 1092]; City of San Antonio v. San Ant071io St.
By. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 1 [39 S.W. 136, 138] ; Anderson v.
Fuller, 51 Fla. 380 [41 So. 684, 688, 120 Am.St.Rep. 170, 6
L.R.A.N.S. 1026]; National Water-Works Co. v. City of Kansas,28 F. 921, 922-923; cf. City of Los Aflgeles v. Los Angeles
Gas &- Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32,39-40 [40 S.Ct. 76, 64 L.Ed_
121] ; State ex rel. Speeth v. Carney, 163 Ohio St. 159 [126
N.E.2d 449, 460] ; Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City de County of
San Francisco, 53 Cal.App. 188, 192-193 [199 P. 1108].)
Panhandle etc. Co. v. State Highway Com., 294 U.S. 613 155
S.Ct. 563, 79 L.Ed. 1090], is not to the contrary, for in that
case the utility's private right of way was involved, not its
right to use the public streets.
[4] The company contends, however, that any implied obligations in its county franchise to relocate its pipes cannot be
invoked for the benefit of the city operating outside its territorial limits. We cannot agree with this contention. Such
obligations rest on the paramount right of the people as a
"vhole to use the public streets wherever located, and the
fact that a franchise is granted by one political subdivision
as an agent of the state (see San Francisco-Oakland Terminal
By&. v. County of Alameda, 66 Cal.A.pp. 77, 83 [225 P. 304] ;
Belfast Water Co. v. City of Belfast, 92 Me. 52 [42 A.. 235,
237]) does not defeat the right of another such agent acting
ill its govcrnmental capac~ty to invoke the public right for
the public benefit. (Fir.,t Nat. Baflk of Boston v. Main Turnpike Auth., 153 Me. ~31 [136 A..2d 699, 711] ; City of San
Antonio v. Bexar Metropolitan W. Dist., (Tex. Civ. App.)
309 S.W.2d 491, 493; Cummins v. City of Seymour, 'l1 Ind.
491 [41 Am.Rep. 618, 623-625] ; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v.
Draiflage Com., 111 La. 838 [35 So. 929, 933] ; see Gadd v.
McQuire, 69 Cal.A.pp. 347, 358-359 [231 P.2d 754].} [5] The
fact that the city's use of county streets for, its sewers is
authorized by section 10101 of the Public Utilities Code has no
bearing on the applicability of the foregoing rule. [6] It is

)
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true that the rights granted to municipal corporations by
that section have been held to constitute franchises subject
to the paramount right of the state to make the streets safe for
public travel (State v. Marin Mun. W. Did., 17 Ca1.2d 699,
703-704 [111 P.2d 651]), but it does not follow that a franchise exercised by a city in its governmental capacity under
that section is subordinate to a prior franchise granted to a
public utility. The utility involved in the Marin case was a
municipal water district operating in a proprietary capacity.
(See City of South Pasadena v. Pasadena Land etc. Co., 152
Cal. 579, 592-593 [93 P. 490].) [71 In the present case, on
the other hand, the city is exercising one of its most important
governmental powers, a power so important that it is one of
the few powers it may exercise outside of its territorial limits
without express authorization. (Harden v. Superior Court,
44 Cal.2d 630, 638-639 [284 P.2d 9] ; MuZville v. City of San
Diego, 183 Cal. 734, 737 [192 P. 702]; McBean v. City of
Fresno, 112 Cal. 159, 163 [44 P. 358, 53 Am.St.Rep. 191, 31
L.R.A. 794]; see also City of National City v. Fritz, 33 Cal.2d
635, 637 [204 P.2d 7] ; City of Madera v. Black, 181 Cal. 306,
312-313 [184 P. 397].) The Marin case itself recognized and
applied the established rqle that a utility's rights in the public
streets are taken subject to the paramount right of public
travel, and as stated above, the same rule applies between
public utilities and municipal corporations using the streets
for sewer purposes.
The company contends, however, that the express terms of
its county franchise define its obligation to relocate its lines
at its own expense and that by clear implication any other
similar obligations are excluded. Section 8 of its franchise
provides that "the County of Los Angeles reserves the right
to change the grade of any highway over which this franchise
is granted, and the grantee of said franchise, its successors or
assigns, shall at on<le change the location of all pipes and other
appliances laid hereunder to conform to such change of grade. "
The city contends that the recital of the obligation to relocate
the gas lines for changes of grade does not exclude other implied obligations to relocate lines and that any attempt to
relieve the company of such obligations would be invalid.
[8] The right of municipal corporations to require utilities
to relocate their lines to make way for governmental uses of
the streets has usually been described as resting in the police
power, and it has frequently been stated in this context that
the police power cannot be bargained away. (National Water-
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Works Co. v. City 01 Kansas, 28 F.921, 922-923; City of
Macon v. Southern Bell Tel. ff Tel. Co., 89 Ga. App. 252 [79
S.E.2d 265, 275] ; Belfast Water Co. v. City of Belfast, 92
Me. 52 [42 A. 235, 237] ; Louisville City Ry. Co. v. City of
Louisville, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 415, 422-423; Scranton Gas ff
Water Co .. v. City of Scranton, 214 Pa. 586 [64 A. 84, 85,
6 L.R.A.N.S. 1033] ; Louisville Gas &- Electric Co. v. Commissioners 01 Sewerage of Louisville, 236 Ky. 376 [33 S.W.2d
344,344-345] ; see New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Com.,
197 U.S. 453, 460 [25 S.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831].) Given,
however, the municipal power to vacate streets or acquire a
lesser interest in them in the first instance than is usually
obtained by the public (see Pennsylt'ania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393,416 [43 S.Ct.158, 67 L.Ed. 322, 28 A.L.R. 1321] ;
Detro·it Edison Co. v. City of Detroit, 332 Mich. 348 [51 N.W.
2d 245, 247-248]), there would appear to be no basic principle
that would prohibit granting a utility a right to compensation
for relocating its lines as part of its franchise although such
right would not otherwise pass. This view finds support in
cases holding that the Legislature may provide for such compensation. (In re Gillen Place, Bor01tgh of Brooklyn, 304
N.Y. 215 [106 N.E.2d 897, 900] ; Baltimore Gas &- Electric
Co. v. State Roads Com., 214 Md. 266 [134 A.2d 312, 315] ;
Philadelphia Sub. W. Co. v. Pennsylvania P. U. Com., 168
Pa. Super. 360 [78 A.2d 46, 51-52] ; Opinion of the Justices,
_.- Me. - - [132 A.2d 440, 443]; Opinion 01 the Justices, - - N.H. - - [132 A.2d 613, 614-615] ; see Columbus
Gaslight ff Coke Co. v. City of Columbus, 50 Ohio St. 65 [33
N.E. 292, 293, 40 Am.St.Rep. 648, 19 L.R.A. 510].)- Perhaps this apparent conflict can be reconciled on the theory
that a state Legislature may authorize franchises granting the
utility the right to compensation for relocating its lines to
make way for governmental uses, but that it will not be held
to have delegated such power );0 a political subdivision in the
absence of express language to that effect. It is unnecessary
to determine, however, whether the county was empowered to
grant a franchise including the right to the compensation here
sought, for we have concluded that properly interpreted the
company's franchise included no such right.
[9] As a public grant the franchise is to be construed in
-It should be noted that we are not here concerned with the question
of the power of the Legislature to grant additional rights under a
franchise after it has been accepted by the utility and the problem
that would be raised thereby of a possible gift of pubJic funds.

)
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favor of the public interest. (Knoxville Water Co. v. Knox1Jille, 200 U.S. 22, 33-34 [26 S.Ct. 224, 50 L.Ed. 353] ; County
of Los A.'ngeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378, 384
[196 P.2d 773] ; City of Sacramento v. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co., 173 Cal. 787, 791 [161 P. 978] ; Civ. Code § 1069.) Its
own terms provide that it "is hereby granted upon each and
every condition herein contained, and shall ever be strictly construed against the grantee and its successors and assigns.
Nothing shall pass hereby unless it be granted in plain and
unambiguous terms." [10] The maxim expressiounius exclusio altenus est cannot be invoked to make plain and unambiguous the right to compensation that the company seeks.
Given the parties' express recognition of the rule of strict
construction against the grantee, paragraph 8 cannot reasonably be interpreted as being more than a partial expression
of the parties ' common-law righto; and obligations (City of
Los Angeles v. City of Gle11dale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 77 [142 P.2d
289] ; Strand Improvement Co. v. City of Long Beach, 173
Cal. 765, 772-773 [161 P. 975]) inserted out of an abundance
of caution or by way of example only. (City of Lexington v.
Comme.rcial Bank, 130 Mo. App. 687 (108 S.W. 1095, 1096] ;
Georgia Power Co. v. Leonard, 187 Ga. 608 [1 S.E.2d 579,
581] ; see also Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189.
206 [48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845] ; Dickey v. Raisin Proration
Zone No.1, 24 Ca1.2d 796, 811 [151 P.2d 505, 157 A.L.R.
324].) Thus, the New York Court of Appeals has pointed
out that despite the existence of express provisions dealing
with the utility '8 obligations with respect to the streets "The
reasonable construction ... is to assume that the people are not
to be burdened with any heavier expense than necessity requires, and that to relieve the public service corporations
having franchises in the streets of their common-law liabilities and to pass them over to the taxpayer can only be accomplished by the express direction of the Legislature." (Transit
Commission v. Long Island R. Co., 253 N.Y. 345 [171 N.E.
565,568] ; see also New York Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 295 N.Y. 467 [68 N.E.2d 445, 448-449].) Chicago
v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 50 [19 L.Ed. 594], State ex reI.
City of Kansas v. Corriga·n C011sol. Street Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 263
[55 Am.Rep. 361], City of Kansas v. Corrigan, 86 Mo. 67,
and Western Union Tel. Co. v. Police Jury, 225 La. 531 [73
So.2d 450], are not to the contrary. The first three of these
cases involved, not competing uses of the streets, but the
extent of the utility's duty to repair and repave the streets,

)
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a matter covered by the' express terms of the franchise~ and
in the Sheldon case the court's interpretation was in accord
with the practical construction placed on the franchise by
the parties. In the fourth case, the competing public use
was so highly unusual that it could not have been contemplated
at the time the franchise was accepted. In the present case,
on the contrary, the use of the streets for sewers was clearly
to be anticipated, the utility's common-law obligation to relocate its pipes to accommodate that use has at all times been
clearly recognized by the law, and there is no provision in
the company's franchise abrogating that obligation by giving
it the right to recover the costs of such relocation.
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
to enter judgment for the defendant city.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring.-Although I agree with the
conclusion reached in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice
Traynor, for the reasons hereinafter stated, I regret my inability to join in said opinion.
My views with respect to the application of article I, section
14, of the Constitution of California to the ordinary situation
in which private property has been taken or damaged for a
public use, have been stated many times in both majority,
dissenting and concurring opinions which I have written as a
member of this court (Rose v. 8tate, 19 Ca1.2d 713 [123 P.2d
505] ; Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Ca1.2d 343 [144 P.2d
818] ; Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 29 [119
P.2d 1] ; O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood etc. Dist., 19
Ca1.2d 61, 64 [119 P.2d 23] ; House v. Los Angeles County
Flood Control Dist., 25 Ca1.2d 384, 398 [153 P.2d 950];
Clement v. 8tate Reclamation Board, 35 Cal.2d 628, 646 [220
P.2d 897]). It will be noted that in all of the cases above
cited it was the position of the public agency which took the
property or caused damage thereto, that the taking or damaging was done under the police power reserved to the state
and its political subdivisions by article XI, section 11, of the
Constitution of California. I did not agree with this contention, and my position in this regard is the same now as it was
then. This is the first case since I have been a member of
this court, in which, in my opinion, the police power doctrine
was applicable to the facts of the case presented. A review
of the above-cited cases reveals a state of confusion in the
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minds of some members of this court with respect to the
situations in which the police power doctrine may be invoked
by the state or a political subdivision thereof to take, damage
or destroy private property without the payment of compensation therefor in contravention of article I, section 14, of the
Constitution of California. (See Rose v. State, supra; Bacich
v. Board of Oontrol, supra; Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles,
supra; O'Hara v. Los Angeles Oounty Flood etc. Dist., supra;
House v. Los Angeles Oounty Flood Oontrol Dist., supra;
Olement v. State Reclamation Board, supra; Beals v. Oity of
Los Angeles, 23 Ca1.2d 381 [144 P .2d 839] ; People v. Ricciardi,
23 Ca1.2d 390 [144 P.2d 799].) A reading of the last-cited
cases including the dissenting and concurring opinions therein
demonstrates the truth of my statement with respect to the
confusion which has existed in the minds of some members of
this court in attempting to distinguish cases involving the
application of article I, section 14 (eminent domain), of the
Constitution and cases involving the application of article XI,
section 11 (police power), of the Constitution of California.
The opinion prepared by :Mr. Justice Traynor in this case
adds to that confusion, as he fails to differentiate between
the powers granted to the state and its political subdivisions
under the last two cited constitutional provisions. Said opinion states: "In the present case, on the other hand, the city
is exercising one of its most important governmental powers,
a power so important that it is one of the few powers it may
exercise outside of its territorial limits without express authorization." He then cites Harden v. Superior Oourt, 44 Cal.
2d 630 [284 P.2d 9], which is a case involving power of eminent domain. Later in his opinion, he states: "The right of
municipal corporations to require utilities to relocate their
lines to make way for governmental uses of the streets has
usually been described as resting in the police power, and it
has frequently been stated in this context that the police power
cannot be bargained away." The cases he cites here correctly
apply the police power doctrine.
In said opinion, :Mr. Justice Traynor also discusses the
power of the Legislature to provide for the payment of
compensation in cases such as this, but this proposition is not
involved here because it is conceded that the Legislature made
no such provision. This discussion is therefore obiter dictum.
There is really no need for the confusion which now exists
in the decisions of this court which have had occasion tv
apply article I, section 14, and article XI, section 11, of the

)
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Constitution of California to particular factual situations as
there is a clear distinction between the power of eminent domain and the police power granted by said constitutional provisions. It may be true that there is a twilight zone where the
line of demarcation between the exercise of the power of
eminent domain and the exercise of the police power is diffi·
cult to discern, but in view of the very clear pronouncements
of the Supreme Court of the United States in this field, this is
not such a case. I say this, notwithstanding my predilection to
hold otherwise before reading the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States applicable to the facts of this case.
(New Orleans Gaslight 00. v. Drainage Com., 197 U.S. 453
[25 8.Ct. 471,49 L.Ed. 831] ; Ohicago, Burlington etc. R. R.
00. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 [17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979];
Ohicago B. & O. Ry. 00. v. Illinois Oommrs., 200 U.S. 561 [26
8.Ct. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596]; New York & N. E. Railroad 00. v.
Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 [14 S.Ct. 437, 38 L.Ed. 269] ; Butchers'
Union etc. 00. v. Orescent Oity etc. Co., 111 U.S. 746 [4 S.Ct.
652, 28 L.Ed. 585]; Btone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 [25
L.Ed. 1079] ; New Orleans Gaslight 00. v. Louisiana Light etc.
00.,115 U.S. 650, 671 [6 S.Ct. 252, 29 L.Ed. 516].) In view
of these decisions, we have here a very simple case which
should be disposed of by an opinion free from the confusion
and dictum which permeates many of the other decisions of
this court in this field. For the sake of clarity only, I have
prepared an opinion which correctly states and disposes of the
issues in this case in accordance with the rules of law as
declared by the Supreme Court of the United States to be
applicable to the factual situation presented here.
Defendant, city of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation,
appeals from a judgment awarding compensation to plaintiff,
Southern California Gas Company, a corporation, for its costs
in relocating its gas lines. The case was tried on an agreed
,~
statement of facts.
The city of Los Angeles, hereinafter referred to as the city,
began a sewer construction program, one of the main part.'>
of which was the construction of the "La Cienega and San
Fernando Valley Relief Sewer." This sewer carries sewage
from the San Fernando Valley to a spot near La Cienega
Boulevard where it meets with the Hyperion disposal plant
line. A small portion of this sewer line passes under a narrow
strip of land known as the County Strip which is located outside the c~ty limits but within an unincorporated area in the
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county of Los Angeles. A portion of the proposed sewer
underlying public streets in the County Strip was OC<:Ujll.1!((
by the gas lines of the Southern California Gas Company• .ueJr~·.1fJl.
inafter called the company. The company agreed to reloCII~te~
its gas lines in the County Strip to make way for the
mains subject to a later determination of its obligation to
so at its own expense. The company conceded its obl[i~llti(m
to relocate its lines at its own expense within the city .......u..,;~j
but denied that it had the same obligation with respect to
lines located in the County Strip. Judgment was
favor of plaintiff company in the sum of $12,003.92, to,~etltler
with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent from March',
1955. The city appeals.
The city argues that a public utility, such as VU'Lll.lI~"'.
obligated to relocate at its own expense its facilities n,n(JI~l'·,;a:
lying public streets within an unincorporated portion of
county to make way for a public improvement being install~
therein by the city. The major points here involved are'i
whether the installation and maintenance of sewers by a mu- '
nicipality for the protection of the public health is an exercise
of the police power; whether the police power of the state is
being exercised by a municipality when it constructs connecting sewers beyond its boundaries; and whether the relocation of gas lines, at the company's expense, constitutes a tak-,
ing of private property without compensation within :the
meaning of the constitutional prohibitions.
There can be no doubt at this time but that the installation
and maintenance of sewers in the interests of the public health
by a municipality is an exercise of the police power. In
Harter v. Barkley, 158 Cal. 742, 744, 745 [112 P. 556], it was
held that "The regulation of the right of laying sewers in
public streets is unquestionably a power conferred upon
municipalities, partly by virtue of the provisions of section
11 of article XI of the constitution of California. The proper
protection of the public health depends very largely upon
the maintenance of a thorough and sanitary sewer system... '.
It has been held, and we think very properly, that ordinances
of a municipal corporation providing for the construction,
maintenance, and repairs of sewers and drains are to be sustained as a valid exercise of police power." "Regulation by .
ordinance of methods and devices for the conveyance of sewage from private dwellings in municipalities is recognized as '
an exercise of that branch of the police power which pertains
to the public health.... " (In re Nicholls, 74 Cal.App. 504,
!
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507 [241 P. 399] ; and see Sullivan v. Oity of Los Angeles, 116
Cal.App.2d 807, 811 [254 P.2d 590].)
The city contends that it is exercising the police power of
the state when it constructs sewers beyond its boundaries and
that it is authorized to do so by section 10101 of the Public
Uti1ities Code and by its city charter. Section 10101, Public
Utilities Code, provides: "There is granted to every municipal corporation of the State the right to construct, operate,
and maintain water and gas pipes, mains and conduits, electric
light and power lines, telephone and telegraph lines, sewers
and sewer mains, aU with the necessary appurtenances, across,
along, in, under, over, or upon any road, street, alley, avenue,
or highway, and across, under, or over any railway, canal,
ditch, or flume which the route of such works intersects,
crosses, or runs along, in such manner as to afford security for
life and property."
The Los Angeles City Charter provides (§ 2(6» that the
city shall be empowered "To make and enforce within its
limits all such local, police, sanitary, safety, welfare and other
regulations as are not in con:ftict with general laws, and to
exercise such jurisdiction outside its limits in such manner as
may be authorized by law." (Emphasis added.)
In Mulville v. Oity of San Diego, 183 Cal. 734, 737 [192
P. 702], it was said: "In general, a municipality is competent
to act beyond its boundaries only in those cases in which it
is so empowered by legislative authority and it is necessary,
in passing upon the validity of acts of a municipality performed beyond its boundaries, to look to the general laws and
municipal charter for the requisite authority. In certain instances, owing to the urgency of extreme expediency or
necessity, express authority is dispensed with and the power
of the municipality to perform certain acts beyond its boundary is implied as incidental to the existence of other powers
expressly granted. Thus it has been held that, where a
municipality has power to construct sewers, it may, as an
implied incident to such power, extend the same beyond its
boundaries when necessary or manifestly desirable. (McBean
v. Oity of Fresno, 112 Cal. 159 [53 Am.St.Rep. 191, 31 L.R.A.
794, 44 P. 358] ; Oity of Ooldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474;
Oochran v. Village of Park Ridge, 138 Ill. 295 [27 N.E. 939] ;
4 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, sec. 1434.)" (Ebritc
v. Orawford, 215 Cal. 724, 728-729 [12 P.2d 937]; In f'C
Blois, 179 Cal. 291, 295 [176 P. 449]; Raynor v. Oity of
Arcata, 11 Cal.2d 113, 120 [77 P.2d 1054].) In In f'e Blois,
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179 Cal. 291, 296 [176 P. 449], we said that we were "dispoS~d·:.
to agree" and "to concede that municipalities may exercise <~
certain extraterritorial powers when the possession and exer-'
cise of such powers are essential to the proper conduct of the
affairs of the municipality. As for example, this court has
held that a municipality has power to construct and maintain
a 'system of waterworks outside of its boundaries for the
supply of its inhabitants with water, and that it might even go
to the extent of supplying water to persons living without the
limits of spch municipality. (South Pasadena v. Pasadena ,3
Land etc. Co., 152 Cal. 579 [93 P. 490].)"
"',i\i
It clearly appears that the city was exercising the police ,;
power of the state by express grant of power as set forth
in section 10101 of the Public Utilities Code as augmented ",
by the provisions of its own charter and, that even had there
not been such an express grant of power, the authority would
be implied from the nature of the work undertaken under
the police power. There can be no question but that it was
imperative that the city's sewage disposal system connect with
the Hyperion disposal plant and that such an exercise of
the police power would have carried with it, by necessary
implication, the power to act without its boundaries in making
the connection. As we said in McBean v. City of Fresno, 112
Cal. 159, 163 [44 P. 358, 53 Am.St.Rep. 191, 31 L.R.A. 794],
where disposition of the outfall of the sewage system outside
the city limits was involved, •• Proper sewers are in this day
so essential to the hygiene and sanitation of a municipality,
that a court would not look to see whether a power to construct
and maintain them had been granted by the charter, but
rather only to see whether by possibility the power had been
expressly denied."
The company contends that the city has neither a contractual right, nor the police power, to compel a utility to relocate
its pipes without compensating the utility when both the pipes
of the utility and the sewage system of the city are without
the city limits. The company argues that its franchise from
the county vested certain rights in it and contained only om'
limitation-that of bearing the expense of relocation of its
lines if the county changed the grade of any highway. In
other words, it is contended that it$ rights under the franchise from the county are by reason of tIle contract and are
limited only by the terms of the contract. The city, on the
other hand, maintains that the use by a public utility of
public streets is subservient to the public use; that if the
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company's argument had merit it would mean that a city, or
county, could impair or surrender its fundamental police
power by contract. Thc city rclics upon the case of New
Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Com., 197 U.S. 453 [25
8.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831], in support of its position. The
court there. said: "It is the contention of the plaintiff in
error that, having acquired the franchise and availed itself
of the right to locate its pipes under the streets of the city,
it has thereby acquired a property right which cannot be taken
from it by a shifting of some of its mains and pipes from their
location to accommodate the drainage system, without compensation for the cost of such changes. It is not contended
that the gas company has acquired such a property right as
will prevent the Drainage Commission, in the exercise of the
police power granted to it by the State, from removing the
pipes so as to make room for its work, but it is insisted that
this can only be done upon terms of compensation for the
cost of removal." The Supreme Court of the United States,
speaking of the case of New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana
Light etc. Co., 115 U.S. 650, 671 [6 8.Ct. 252, 29 L.Ed. 5161.
said: "Except that the privilege was conferred to use the
streets in laying the pipes in some places thereunder, there
was nothing in the terms of the grant to indicate the intention
of the State to give up its control of the public streets, certainly not so far as such power might be required by proper
regulations to control their use for legitimate purposes connected with the public health and safety." And, quoting from
the same ease, it was said: " 'The constitutional prohibition
upon state laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not
restrict the power of the State to protect the public health,
the public morals, or the public safety, as the one or the
other may be involved in the execution of such contracts.
Rights and privileges arising from contracts with a State are
subject to regulations for the protection of the public health,
the public morals, and the public safety, in the same sense,
and to the same extent, as are all contracts and all property,
whether owned by natural persons or corporations.'" Thc
court further said: •• The drainage of a city in the interest of
the public health and welfare is one of the most important
purposes for which the police power can be exercised. The
Drainage Commission, in carrying out this important work,
it has been held by the Supreme Court of the State, is engaged
in the execution of the police power of the State." And "It
is admitted that in the exercise of this power there has been
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no more interference with the property of the gas company
than has been necessary to the carrying out of the drainage
plan. There is no showing tbat the value of the property of
the gas company has been depreciated nor tbat it has suffered "
any deprivation further than the expense which was rendered !
necessary by the changing of the location of the pipes to
acco,mmodate the work of the Drainage Commission. The
police power, insofar as its exercise is essential to the health
of the community, it has been held cannot be contracted away.
New York & N. E. Railroad 00. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 567
[14 S.Ct. 437, 48 L.Ed. 269] ; Butchers' Union etc. Co. v. Orescent City etc. Co., 111 U.S. 746, 751 [4 S.Ot. 652, 28 L.Ed.
585] ; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 816 [25 L.Ed. 1079}.
In a large city like New Orleans, situated as it is, and the
entrepot of an extensive commerce coming from many foreign
countries, it is of the highest importance that the public
health shall be safeguarded by all proper means. It would
be unreasonable to suppose that in the grant to the gas
company of the right to use the streets in the laying of its
pipes it was ever intended to surrender or impair the public
right to discharge the duty of conserving the public health.
The gas company did not acquire any specific location in the
streets; it waS content with the general right to use them,
and when it located its pipes it was at the risk that they might
be, at some future time, disturbed, when the State might require for a necessary public use that changes in location be
made..•.
.. The need of occupation of the soil beneath the streets
in cities is constantly increasing, for the supply of water and
light and the construction of systems of sewerage and drainage, and every reason of public policy requires that grants
of rights in such sub-surface shall be held subject to such
reasonable regulation as the public health and safety may
require. There is nothing in the grant to the gas company,
etlen if it cottld legally be done, undertaking to limit the right
of the State to establish a system of drainage in the streets.
We think whatever right the gas company acquired was subject insofar as the location of its pipes was concerned, to such
future regulations as might be required in the interest of the
public health and welfare. These views are amply sustained
by the authoritiell." (Emphasis added.) Speaking of Chicago, Burlington etc. R. R. 00. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 254
[17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979], the court said: "In the latter
case it was held that uncompensated obediencet!> a regulation
I
I
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enacted for the public safety under the police power of the
State was not taking property without due compensation. In
our view, that is all there is to this case. The gas company,
by its grant from the city, acquired no exclusive right to the
location' of its pipes in the streets, as chosen by it, under a
general grant of authority to use the streets. The city made
no contract that the gas company should not be disturbed
in the location chosen. In the exercise of the police power
of the State, for a purpose highly necessary in the promotion
of the public health, it has become necessary to change the
location of the pipes of the gas company so as to accommodate
them to the new public work. In complying with this requirement at its own expense none of the property of the gas company has been taken, and the injury sustained is damnum
absque injuria."
Company argues that its franchise gave it vested rights
which cannot be taken away without payment of compensation.
In Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195, 204 [34 S.Ct. 517, 58
L.Ed. 912, L.R.A. 1918E 882], relied upon by company in
support of its contention, a gas company operating under a
provision of the Constitution of California sought to lay additional pipes in streets not theretofore used by it. The city of
Los Angeles, by ordinance, prohibited, in effect, the use by the
company of the streets not theretofore used by it. The Supreme
Court held that the grant to the gas company which resulted
from an acceptance of the state's offer constituted a contract
and vested in the company a property right "protected by the
Federal Constitution {is], not open to dispute in view of the
repeated decisions of this court. " The effect of the municipal
ordinance in the Russell case was to take away from the gas
company its right to extend its mains and lines into additional
streets in order to provide additional service to the people.
No such rights are involved in the case at bar. We are here
concerned merely with a relocation of existing lines in order
to make way for a .sewage system being constructed for the
benefit of the public. The company's vested property right
here is to continue its lines and installations at some, rather
than a specific, location within the public streets. By such a
relocation, property "is not, within the meaning of the Constitution, taken for public use, nor is the owner deprived of it
without due process of law." (Chicago, B. &. Q. R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 [17 8.0t. 581, 4] L.Ed. 979].) In
Chicago B. &- Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 605 [26
8.0t. 341, 50 L.Ed. 596], the court said that it had "recognized
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the principle that injury may often come to private property ,
as the result of legitimate governmental action, reasonably
taken for the public good and for no other purpose, and yet
there will be no taking of such property within the meaning of
the constitutional guaranty against the deprivation of property without due process of law, or against the taking of
private property for public use without compensation. To
this class belongs the recent, and as we think, decisive case of
New Orleans GasUght Co. v. Drainage Commission . .•• " And,
at pages 609, 610, "Upon the general subject there is no real
con1lict among the adjudged cases. Whatever conflict there is
arises upon the question whether there has been or will be
in the particular case, within the true meaning of the Constitution, a 'taking' of private property for public use. If
the injury complained of is only incidental to the legitimate
exercise of governmental powers for the public good, then there
is no taking of property for the public use, and a right to
compensation, on account of such injury, does not attach uuder
the Constitution."
The company .in support of its argument that its vested
rights cannot be impaired without compensation also citt>.s
the case of City 0/ Los A'IIgeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec.
Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 39 [40 S.Ct. 76, 64 L.Ed. 121], that "A
franchise conveys rights, and if their exercise could be prevented or destroyed by a simple declaration of a municipal
council, they would be infirm indeed in tenure and substance.
It is to be remembered that they came into existence by
compact, having. therefore, its sanction, urged by reciprocal
benefits, and are attended and can only be exercised by expenditure of money, making them a matter of investments and
property, and entitled as such against being taken without th~
proper process of law,-the payment of compensation." In
the Los Angeles case, supra, a clear distinction exists which
was specifically noted by the court: "what the city did was
done not in its governmental capacity-an exercise of the
police power-but in its •proprietary or quasi-private capacity'
and that therefore the city was subordinate in right to the
corporation, the latter being an earlier and lawful occupant
of the field. The difference in the capacities is recognized and
the difference in attendant powers pointed out in decisions
of this court. Vilas v. Ma1ll1a, 220 U.S. 345 [31 S.Ct. 416,
55 L.Ed. 491] ; Rttssell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195 [34 S.Ct.
517, 58 L.Ed. 912, L.R.A. 1918E 882]; South Caroli'lla v.
Utlited States, 199 U.S. 437 [26 S.Ot. 110, 50 L.Ed. 261] ; New
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Orleans GtJ8Zight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U.S. 453
[25 S.Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831] ; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Water.
works Co., 206 U.S. 496, 508 [27 S.Ct. 762, 51 L.Ed. 1155]."
(251 U.S. at pp. 38, 39.) The city in the instant case was
acting in its governmental capacity-in the exercise of police
powers granted to it by the state-and in the interests of the
public health and welfare. The city, in the Los Angeles case,
supra, sought to establish a lighting system of its own. It
was noted that the only question was "whether a city may as a
matter of public right and without compensation clear a
'space' for the instrumentalities of its system by removing or
relocating the instrumentalities of other systems." (251 U.S.
at p. 37.) It was specifically held: "It will be observed that
we are not concerned with the duty of the corporation oper·
ating a publie utility to yield uncompensated obedience to a
police measure adopted for the protection of the public, but
with a proposed uncompensated taking or disturbance of
what belongs to one lighting system in order to make way for
another. And this the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. What
the grant was at its inception it remained and was not subject
to be displaced by some other system, even that of the city,
without compensation to the corporation for the rights appropriated." (251 U.S. at p. 40.)
Company next argues that the state cannot inipair the obligation of its contracts without compensation. From this argument company reasons that because its franchise contained
only one condition-the relocation of its installations at itS own
expense in the event of changes in the highway grade-no
other conditions may be imposed. It will be recalled that
this point was specifically considered in the case of New
Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U.S. 453 [25
S.Ct.471,49 L.Ed. 831], where it was held that "The police
,power, insofar as its exercise is essential to the health of the
community, it has been held ~ilnot be contracted away" and
that "There is nothing in the grant to the gas company, 6tlen
if it could legally be done, undertaking to limit the right of
the State to establish a system of drainage in the streets. We
think whatever right the gas company acquired was subject
insofar as the location of its pipes was concerned, to such
future regulations as might be required in the interest of the
public health and welfare." Company contends that the rules
set forth in the New Orleans Gaslight case have been "disposed of very tersely" by the case of Panhandle 'E. Pipeline
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CO. v. State Highway Com., 294 U.S. 613 [55 S.Ct. 563, 79 .
L.Ed. 1090]. The Panhandle case involved a Delaware corporation which had obtained, by purchase, rights of ways
from owners of property to construct and maintain conduits
for transporting natural gas. In 1930 it purchased rights of
way for pipes, auxiliary telephone lines, etc. After the pipes
were in operation, the Highway Commission of Kansas, in
1933, pursuant to statute adopted plans for new highways
across the company's rights of way in several places. The
state obtained permission from the owners of the fee to use
the land obtained for the highways, but the company refused
to permit the use of its right of way. The state court had
held that the new highways were being constructed under
the police power of the state and that the necessary relocation
of the company's installations at company expense did not
constitute a taking of private property without due process of
law. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
state court holding (p. 619) that "A claim that action is
being taken under the police power of the state cannot justify
disregard of constitutional inhibitions." It can readily be
seen that there are important distinctions between the Panhandle case and the New Orleans Gaslight case and the case
at bar. In the Panhandle case the company had purchased
rights of way from private owners of land for its installations.
In the New Orleans Gaslight ease and the case at bar, the
companies were granted permission to use the subsurface of
public roads already in existence. In the Panhandle case,
the state desired to construct new highways over the private
rights of way previously acquired by the company. The
acquisition of and construction of public highways does not
come within the purview of the police power but is accomplished under the power of eminent domain embraced within
section 14 of article I of the Constitution of the State of
California. (See Rose v. State, 19 Ca1.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505] ;
Beals v. City of Los .Angeles, 23 Ca1.2d 381 [144 P.2d 839] ;
Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343 [144 P.2d 818] ;
People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390 [144 P.2d 799].) The
Supreme Court of the United States did not overrule, either
directly or indirectly, the New Orleans Gaslight case, but distinguished it as being within the purview of the exercise
of the police power as follows: "New Orleans Gaslight Co. v.
Drainage Commission, 197 U.S. 453 [49 L.Ed. 831, 258.Ct.
471], and similar cases concerning pipes in public streets are
not controlling. In them the pipes were laid upon agreement,
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actual or implied, that the owner would make reasonable
changes when directed by the municipality." (P. 623.)
.It was specifically pointed out in the New Orleans Gaslight
case that the police power of the sovereignty could not be contracted away and that any franchise, such as we have under
consideration here, must be considered, insofar as location of
gas installations is concerned, to have been acquired subject
to such future regulations as might be required in the interest
of the public health and welfare. As the Supreme Court said
in Chicago, BurUngton etc. B. B. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
254 [17 S.Ct. 581,41 L.Ed. 979], "uncompensated obedience
to a regulation enacted for the public safety under the police
power of the state was not taking property without due compensation. " This holding was again stated and approved in
New Orleans Public 8ef'1Jice v. New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682,
687 [50 S.Ct. 449, 74 L.Ed. 1115].
Both the city and company rely upon Merced Falls Gas
etc. Co. v. Turner, 2 Cal.App. 720, 721, 723, '124 [84 P. 239],
in support of their positions. The Merced case involved the
relocation of some electric light poles on a city street. The
company brought an action to enjoin the city and, after declining to amend its complaint, judgment was entered upon
defendant city's demurrers. The court noted that "The sole
contention of appellant [company] in both appeals involves
the power of the city authorities to compel or make the change
in question.' 'The court, in holding that the city had the
power to compel the relocation of the poles, said: "But the
constitution, in providing for the exercise and enjoyment of
the franchise owned by appellant [company], did not grant
an absolute, indefeasible right or easement in the particular
spots of earth where its poles were planted originally, nor
does the grant contain a hint that the superintendent of
streets, or other officer in control thereof, exhausted his jurisdiction or power to direct or control the use of the streets by
appellant, when the poles were located in the first instance
. . . and therefore such regulations, or the absence of them,
cannot limit or annul the general power granted to the municipality, to direct and control the manner in which the streets
shall be used, and the franchise exercised. Courts will not
hesitate to stay the arm of municipal power when any attempt
to curtail or deny the constitutional right is made manifest
or a clear abuse of discretion is shown. But they will as
unhesitatingly frown upon the doctrine tbat the constitutional
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provision in question must· be construed as an abdication or']
denial of power on the part of cities to widen, straighten,'
beautify and improve streets and sidewalks, and to compel
property owners of every class and kind to conform to all
reasonable regulations redounding to the general good." Company relies on the following language from the same case:
•• It may be contended that the averment of irreparable injury
sufficiently shows that the regulation is unreasonable and confiscatory. The damage which has already accrued is estimated
at $1,000, and it is difficult to guess why the sum total of
dllmage resulting from the removal of all the poles may not'
be as easiJy estimated and compensated." From this company argues that the holding of the case is that the company
tllere was entitled to damages accruing by reason of the relocation of its poles. The case cannot be construed as contended
for by company since the question of the cost of relocating
the poles was not involved. The only contention made there
was that the city did not have the power to compel the company to relocate its poles and any statement which did not
bear upon that question is clearly dictum. Company cites
many other cases in support of its position, none of which is
in point. Btockton Gas etc. Co. v. Ban Joaquin County, 148
Cal. 313 [83 P. 54, 7 Ann. Cas. 511, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 174], held
that the situs where a franchise was used was where it was to
be taxed; Matter of RtlBsell, 163 Cal. 668 [126 P. 875, Ann.
Cas. 1914A 152]. held that a gas company had no vested
rights in streets not previously used by it for the laying of
gas mains; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 160 Cal. 106
(116 P. 557]. was concerned with the situs of a franchise as
taxable property; South Pasadena v. Pasadena Lana etc. Co.,
152 Cal. 579 (93 P. 490], involved the sale and transfer of a
franchise for the supplying of water by a private corporation
to a munil'ipal corporation ; County of Los Angeles v. Bouthern
Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378 [196 P.2d 773], involved an attempt by the county to collect a tax from the defendant which
had obtained a franchise from the state under section 536 of
the Civil Code. In Matter of Keppelmann, 166 Cal. 770
[138 P. 346], a municipal ordinance provided that written permission had to be obtained from the board of public
works before excavations could be made in streets occupied
by a gas company for its pipes and conduits. This court
held that the company's rights under the constitutional
grant were .. not absolute" but subject to the direction of
those in control of such streets. Rose v. State, 19 Ca1.2d 713,
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730 [123 P.2d 505], involved inverse condemnation proceedings; Archer v. City of Los AngeZes, 19 Ca1.2d 19 (119 P.2d
1], was erroneously decided under the police power doctrine
but in reality involved only inverse condemnation under
article I, section 14, of the California Constitution. House v.
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Ca1.2d 384 [153
P.2d950]," involved an action in inverse condemnation for
damages sustained by plaintiff because of the negligence of
the defendant in the planning and construction of certain
llood control channel work in the Los Angeles River. Tbis
case in effect overruled the Archer case, BUpra. Hossom v.
City of Long Beach, 83 Ca1.App.2d 745 [189 P.2d 787], involved an action to redeem land which had been sold for
delinquent taxes. City of Los AngeZes v. Klinke.r, 219 Cal.
198 [25 P.2d 826, 90 A.L.R. 148], involved the condemnation
of land for public uses and held that the buildings and other
fixtures on the land must be considered in determining the
owner's compensation. In Sacramento etc. Dist. v. Pacific
G. ct E. Co., 72 Ca1.App.2d 638 [165 P.2d 741], a special
proceeding in eminent domain under the Public Utilities Act.
Company's arguments concerning statutory authority for
payment of compensation for utility relocations are of no avail
here and it is only necessary to point out that no such statutory authority exists to cover the situation with which we are
here concerned.
For the foregoing reasons I am compelled to join with the
majority and vote for a reversal of the judgment with directions to the trial court to enter judgment for the defendant
city.
McCOMB, J.-I "dissent. I would afBrm the judgment for
the reasons stated by the District Court of Appeal in Southern
California Gas Co. v. City of Los A.ngeles, (Ca1.App.) 318
P.2d 735.
'"

<'

Schauer, J.; concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September
24, 1958. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.
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under which the property was distributed entirely to the surviving relative of the wife to the exclusion of relatives of the
predeceased husband, is reversed, and the cause is remanded
to the superior court with directions to enter a decree distributing the proceeds of the subject policy in accordance
with the views hereinabove expressed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.
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